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Abstract
This paper explores the status of some notions which are usually as-
sociated to time, like datations, chronology, durations, causality, cosmic
time and time functions in the Einsteinian relativistic theories. It shows
how, even if some of these notions do exist in the theory or for some par-
ticular solution of it, they appear usually in mutual conflict: they cannot
be synthesized coherently, and this is interpreted as the impossibility to
construct a common entity which could be called time. This contrasts
with the case in Newtonian physics where such a synthesis precisely con-
stitutes Newtonian time.
After an illustration by comparing the status of time in Einsteinian physics
with that of the vertical direction in Newtonian physics, I will conclude
that there is no pertinent notion of time in Einsteinian theories.
Keywords
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1 The vanishing of time
The goal of this paper is to develop and to justify the affirmation that
Einsteinian relativity is the theory of the vanishing of time; more exactly,
of the replacement of space and time by space-time. Quoting Hermann
Minkowski (1864 - 1909), “ The views of space and time which I wish to
lay down for you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics, and
therein lies their strength. They are radical. Henceforth space by itself,
and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only
a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality. ” (80th As-
sembly of the German Natural Scientists and Physicians, Ko¨ln, september
21, 1908). This is true already for the special theory of relativity, and this
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is its central property. This is still more crucial for the general theory of
relativity.
The analysis presented here offers no original idea (excepted the anal-
ogy in section 3.1). Everything can be found in manuals or in some
epistemological analyses concerning the Einsteinian relativistic theories.1
However, this literature is in general not concerned about the status of
the notions analyzed here, and about the status of time in Einsteinian
physics (see however the papers of Rovelli and Anderson in the refer-
ences, whose conceptions agree with those presented here although with
a different focus, more concerned with the attempts to quantize gravity;
and the work of Barbour [3], who defends an original position which goes
however beyond the frame of Einsteinian physics). The goal here is to
offer a synthesis and a panorama of the notions which could be claimed
to be linked to time, and to give a clear explanation of what is meant by
the disappearance of time in Einsteinian theories.
This clarification appears desirable since one finds often in the liter-
ature references to time in the analysis of a relativistic situation. This
short way to refer to a time function or a proper duration may give the
false impression that such notions have the properties that we usually at-
tribute to time. Apart from being a possible source of false statements,
this may orient an ontological analysis into erroneous directions. Thus I
estimate that this review may be especially useful for philosophers.
The paper analyzes the notions of datation, chronology, durations,
causality and cosmic time, both in the Newtonian and Einsteinian the-
ories. In Newtonian physics, these notions can be synthesized to form
“ Newtonian time ”. Here, I defend the conclusion that, even if some of
these notions do exist in Einsteinian theories, or in some particular solu-
tion of them, it is impossible to synthesize them coherently to construct
a common entity which could be called time, as is the case in Newtonian
physics.
In section 2, I analyze the collection of the main characteristics of
Newtonian time, in relation with the notions mentioned above, whose
synthesis precisely leads to the construction of time (through the property
of datation). Then, section 3 introduces special relativity, and illustrates
the disappearance of time there; first by showing that some of the above
notions with temporal flavor have no counterpart; secondly by showing
that the different remaining notions — causal structure, proper durations
and time-functions — cannot be synthesized coherently to construct an
entity with the properties of time. In section 3.1 I suggest an original
historical analogy to illustrate this absorption of time into space-time.
Section 4 introduces the general theory of relativity and, concentrating
on the differences with the special theory, I show how the disappearance
of time is still more crucial. I present (section 5) a specific analysis of
time-functions in the theory that I illustrate (section 5.3) with the case of
1 As it is well known, the Galilean or Newtonian physics is also relativistic, in the sense
that it obeys the Relativity Principle. I will however conform to the usage of calling “ special
relativity ” and “ general relativity ” the two Einsteinian theories. Hereafter, “ Einsteinian”
will refer to both theories where the status of the notions analyzed here are analogous. For
instance, Einsteinian space-time refers both to the Minkowski spacetime of special relativity,
and to the space-time of general relativity.
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cosmology and cosmic time.
2 Newtonian time
“ What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to
explain it to him who asks me, I do not know. Yet I say with confidence
that I know that if nothing passed away, there would be no past time; and
if nothing were still coming, there would be no future time; and if there
were nothing at all, there would be no present time. ”
Augustine, (Chapter XV:17)
The success of Newtonian physics was largely due to the introduction
of a frame for Physics: the Universe, unique and unified by definition. This
is a prerequisite for the universality of the physical laws, which is itself
a requirement for the scientific methodology; in other words, a necessary
condition for physics: no physics without universal law (a prerequisite
for experimental methodology) ; no universal law without an universal
framework.
Newton defined this universal framework to be composed of space and
time, whose properties are given in his Principia. In many aspects, the
Newtonian conceptions about space and time agree with those of our
intuition. This helps a lot for understanding them. On the other hand,
this may be an obstacle for realizing that they do not represent the reality
of the world; in particular that there is no analog to the Newtonian time
in nature, as well expressed in the Einsteinian relativistic theories.
Since Newton, many observational and experimental results have shown
to physicists that the real world is incompatible with the existence of New-
tonian time. Although this is well known, I claim that it is incompatible
with the notion of time itself, defined as an entity admitting a minimum
collection of properties that we usually attribute to time. Although this
is well taken into account by the Einsteinian theories of relativity, this
is a property of nature which does not depend on any physical theory or
model, and which is more and more confirmed by our progressing experi-
mental and observational exploration of the world. How is it possible to
reconcile this fact with our use of the notion of time in ordinary life ?
Which time-related notions can be defined in relativistic theory? I will
try to answer these questions.
Although nobody, in physics or in philosophy, has claimed to give a
definitive and complete definition of time, we know quite well the proper-
ties of Newtonian time. Whatever we would like to call “ time ” should
share at least a subsample of these properties. Thus, it is a prerequisite
for the study of temporal notions in any theory to examine the properties
of Newtonian time.
Many particular circumstances offer the possibility to define some en-
tities with temporal flavor, i.e., which share such or such property of the
Newtonian time (e.g., “ proper times”, or “ cosmic time”). I claim that
we must resist the temptation of referring to them as time, since it is
impossible to reconcile them with other properties that we also desire
associate to time, without generating contradictory statements. This is
3
what I interpret as a manifestation of the impossibility of existence of
time.
2.0.1 The Newtonian space-time
A large part of this paper will compare some properties of Newtonian
Physics with those of Einsteinian Physics. But it may be not easy to really
appreciate the deep differences between the two theories, because they are
masked by their different formulations. For that reason, it may appear
convenient to express them in a common language, and to reformulate
part of the Newtonian approach in order to make easier the comparison
with Einsteinian physics. This does not change the physics, but only the
way to express it, which may appear quite unfamiliar. Concretely, I will
introduce a notion of a Newtonian space-time, to compare it with the
Einsteinian space-time.
Both theories consider space-time as a geometric entity (thus a set
with geometrical properties); the occurrence of a physical event is iden-
tified with an element (or point) of space-time. 2 This definition makes
sense both in the Newtonian and in the Einsteinian framework. Their
respective space-times admit different well defined geometrical structures,
that I will not discuss here in details. The main property of Newtonian
space-time (not shared by the Einsteinian one) is that it can be uniquely
decomposed into a product of Space and a time-line. 3 This splits the
Newtonian chrono-geometry into a spatial geometry plus a chronome-
try. The existence of Newtonian time is equivalent to a metric structure
(chronometry) of the time line, entirely independent from the spatial ge-
ometry. The introduction of the Einsteinian theories results from the
realization (first by Einstein) that the real world phenomena are incom-
patible with this conception.
2.1 A datation is a time-function
The first, and probably the more fundamental property of Newtonian
time, is datation. As I will show, the whole collection of its other prop-
erties result from datation, and I will adopt the position that a minimal
requirement for a notion of “ time” is to be – at least – a datation.
A datation is a process which assigns to any event a real number
called its date. This is a function from space-time to the set IR of real
numbers, here called the time-line, what we equally call a time-function.
The Newtonian datation is build-in the geometrical (fiber bundle) struc-
ture of Newtonian theory, where it appears precisely as a projection of
space-time (with fiber bundle structure) onto its basis, the time-line (the
possibility of such a projection disappears in Einsteinian theories).
2 It is tempting to define space-time as the set of all events and some modern approaches
adopt indeed this position. In our present vision of the world (Newtonian or Einsteinian), we
admit the possibility of points of space-time (in Newtonian physics, a date and a location)
where no physical event occurs; but since an event could occur (or have occurred) there,
space-time may be seen as the set of possible occurrences of events.
3 More correctly, it is defined as a fiber bundle manifold, with the time line as basis
manifold.
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The datation specifies immediately a unique and well defined total or-
dering of the events: the chronological ordering (more simply, the chronol-
ogy) of space-time.
We will examine below the possible existence of time-functions in Ein-
steinian theories. A first important result is that some space-times wich
are solutions of general relativity do not admit any time-function (some
solutions, like the Go¨del space-time[12], admit local but not global time-
functions). As a second result, a space-time solution which admits a
time-function does admit an infinite collection of them (even in the sim-
plest case of Minkowski spacetime). One may wish to adopt a particular
one (like for example the cosmic time in cosmology, see below), and to
promote it to the status of “ time ”. We will see that this leads to three
kinds of problems:
- this may be simply not be possible in some solutions of general relativity;
- when possible, such a choice is arbitrary. Different choices lead to dif-
ferent estimations of the date of an event, of the “ duration ” separating
two events, and even (in some cases), of their chronological ordering; this
means that, for two given events A and B (not causally connected, see
below), one choice implies that ” A is chronologically posterior to B ” ;
and the other that ” B is posterior to A ”.
- the chronological notions derived from a time-function usually contradict
physical measurements: physical events with different dates may appear
simultaneous (and vice versa); the “ chronological duration ” of a process,
as derived from a time-function differs in general from its proper duration,
obtained as the result of a physical measurement.
We will see in which particular circumstances it is possible, in the
Einsteinian context, to chose a time function with a special status, and
to which extent it may share some properties of the (Newtonian) time.
2.2 The properties of Newtonian time
The datation defines a chronology : a total ordering of all points of
space-time, thus of all events, thanks to their dates. The chronological
past (present / future) of an given event is well defined as the subset of
events with a smaller (equal / greater) date.
The causal structure is defined as the relation which answers the question
“ which events are a possible cause of (can have an influence on) a given
event ? ”. The causal structure of Newtonian physics is strictly equivalent
to its chronology, thus a total ordering.
Simultaneity : Events are (chronologically) simultaneous when they have
the same date.
Space (at time t) is the subset of all events (or of points of space-time)
which share the same date t.
Duration is a number which can be assigned to any physical process. It
is a physical quantity, that we can measure with a clock.
2.2.1 Durations
I insist on that property since its status will be completely modified in
Einsteinian theories. A duration is an assignment of a real number – its
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duration – to any process (that we also call a history).
In Newtonian physics, duration is defined from the datation : the
duration of a process is the difference between the dates of its final and
initial events. Hence, the important property:
(D) = the duration of a process only depends on its initial and final events.
The Einsteinian theories admit the notion of proper duration of a pro-
cess: a unique real number, assigned to it by the metric of space-time.
But it is not linked to any time function (or time) and does not obey
the property (D) above: it depends not only on the terminal events of
the process, but on the details of its whole history as illustrated by the
famous twin “ paradox ”. 4 In particular, when a time function is defined,
the proper duration of a physical process is not the differences between
its values (the “ dates ”) at the terminal events.
3 Special relativity
The best characterization of the relativistic revolution is the replacement
of space + time (which together form what we have called Newtonian
space-time) by a 4-dimensional space-time as the frame for physics. Al-
though Newtonian space and time each admit a separate metric, Ein-
steinian space-time admits an unique spatio-temporal metric: this is a
4-dimensional Lorentzian manifold, i.e., a differentiable manifold with a
Lorentzian metric (see below). Any notion with temporal flavor is defined
from the space-time metric, not from a temporal metric.
The space-time of special relativity is Minkowski spacetime, the only
4-dimensional flat Lorentzian manifold. 5 It is homogeneous and isotropic,
which means that it admits a maximal group of isometries. 6. Its isotropy
implies the complete equivalence of all time-like directions. In a Riema-
nian manifold (like Newtonian space), isotropy means the equivalence of
all possible directions, in the sense that they can be exchanged by a ro-
tation without modifying any property. In a Lorentzian manifold, this is
slightly different since the metric divides the possible directions into three
families : space-like, time-like and light-like, see below. Isotropy implies
the equivalence of all time-like directions. Newtonian space-time is not
isotropic since it admits a unique time-line which has a special status
compared to all other directions
The choice of a time function (i.e., of a datation) selects an arbitrary
direction in space-time and breaks this isotropy (conversely, the selection
of a temporal direction defines an infinite family of datations). The infinite
number of different possibilities to accomplish such a breaking leads to an
infinite number of possible time functions, leading to mutual contradictory
statements about temporal notions (see below).
4 originally proposed by Paul Langevin. It appears, however, as a paradox only when one
tries to reconcile it with a notion of time.
5 up to topological variants [18].
6In a [pseudo-]Riemanian manifold, an isometry is a transformation (diffeomorphism)
which preserves the metric. Any [pseudo-]Riemanian manifold admits a group of isometries.
When it is maximal, the manifold is said to be homogeneous and isotropic
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3.1 A Newtonian analogy
The isotropy of Minkowski space-time is a fundamental fact of relativistic
physics, and the deep expression of the non existence of time. For this
reason, I will present an analogy7 between the status of time in Minkowski
spacetime and the status of the vertical in Newtonian space: an analogy
between the transition from Aristotelician Physics to Newtonian Physics
and the transition from Newtonian Physics to Einsteinian Physics.
3.1.1 From Aristotle to Newton
• Pre-Newtonian physics distinguishes horizontal and vertical direc-
tions. Horizontal directions form a 2-dimensional isotropic plane;
the-1 dimensional vertical direction is exterior to it.
This is for instance manifest in the Aristotelian claim that the nat-
ural motion (in the sublunar world) is vertical. This may be called
a fundamental anisotropy of pre-Newtonian space. 8
• The Newtonian transition is the replacement
horizontal (plane) + vertical → 3-dimensional isotropic space.
This isotropy means that all dimensions have the same status. This
goes against the empirical evidence since our main experience is
terrestrial: we have no chance to experience the isotropy of Newto-
nian space since it is masked by the gravitational field of the Earth.
One aspect of the Newtonian revolution was precisely to disentangle
gravitational effects from spatial geometry.
• All rotations are permitted in Newtonian physics, including those
mixing vertical and horizontal dimensions.
• There is no way (except in the local terrestrial environment) to select
a vertical among all the spatial directions. The vertical appears as
the signature of something new, and exterior to geometry of space:
the local gravitational field.
• There is no meaning of the vertical in empty space: it can be any
direction and there is no canonical way to select one.
• In a group theoretical formulation, the rotation group SO(2) of 2-
dimensional plane is improved to the rotation group SO(3) of 3-
dimensional space. The choice of a particular direction (e.g., to be
called the vertical) is a breaking of the corresponding SO(3) symme-
try; or, equivalently, a group reduction SO(3) → SO(2).
3.1.2 From Newton to Einstein
Replacing “ horizontal / vertical ” by “ space / time ”; and “ space ”
by “ space-time ”; everything can be imported to depict the Einsteinian
revolution.
• Pre-Einsteinian Physics distinguishes space and time. Space forms
a 3-dimensional isotropic manifold; the one-dimensional time-line is
7 that I have also developed in [14].
8 although, strictly speaking, the notion of space is an anachronism in this context.
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exterior to it. This may be called the fundamental anisotropy of
pre-Einsteinian space-time.
• The Einsteinian transition (special relativity) :
space + time → 4-dimensional isotropic space-time.
This isotropy means that all time-like dimensions have the same
status.
Again, this goes against the empirical evidence since our main expe-
rience distinguishes space and time. We have no chance to experience
the isotropy of space-time, since it is masked by our impossibility to
reach high velocities (compared to c). Einsteinian theories account
of this as a consequence of our particular status, being unable to
suffer high acceleration and to reach high velocities.
• All rotations are permitted in Einsteinian physics, including those
mixing spatial and temporal dimensions: they are called boosts (or
inertial transformations).
• There is no way (except in special conditions to be examined) to
select a “ time ” among all the (time-like) directions.
• In empty space-time, any time-like direction can be chosen as a
substitute of time; there is no way to select one. One may wish to
interpret this as “ Time is nowhere ”, or as “ Time is any direction
in space-time ”, see below.
• In a group theory formulation, the rotation group SO(3) of 3-dimensional
space is improved to the rotation group SO(1,3) of 4-dimensional
Minkowski space-time, the Lorentz group.
The choice of a particular direction (implied by that of a time func-
tion) is a breaking of the corresponding Lorentz symmetry; or, equiv-
alently, a group reduction SO(3,1) → SO(3), from the Lorentz group
to the spatial rotation group.
3.1.3 Selection: vertical and time functions
In empty space, all directions are equivalent. How to select one? Where is
the vertical ? Maybe I would like to refer to the direction to my (distant)
planet Earth ? Or to the nearest planet, or star, of which I am feeling
the gravitational attraction ? Or, more simply, the direction to my space
ship ? Or that of my feet ? ...
In any case, a choice involves something exterior to the geometry;
something in addition to space, usually linked to a gravitational force.
The situation is exactly similar for the direction of time in space-
time: there are infinitely many equivalent possible directions which may
be chosen as time-functions. They lead to contradictory notions of, e.g.,
chronology. In any case, something exterior to the chrono-geometry is
needed to select a direction: like the presence of some material system.
The problem is that different matter components define different and in-
compatible “ time-functions ”. The choice, in Einsteinian space-time, of a
time direction which coincides with my proper time along my own world-
line (see below) has the same status than the choice, in Newtonian space,
of the vertical as the direction to my feet.
8
4 Einsteinian Relativistic theories
An Einsteinian theory, and more generally a metric theory, considers that
the frame of physics is a space-time: : a 4-dimensional Lorentzian man-
ifold, i.e., a differentiable manifold with a Lorentzian metric (and some
additional properties). To this metric – which is a tensor – is associated
a curvature (also a tensor) which expresses the“ shape ” of space-time.
• In special relativity, the metric is entirely specified and has no cur-
vature (it is flat). It is called the Minkowski metric, and the space-
time is called the Minkowski space-time. Gravitation is not taken
into account.
• In general relativity, the Lorentzian metric has a curvature identified
with the gravitational field. It is not fixed a priori but is obtained
“ dynamically ” as a result of the field equations: the Einstein equa-
tions. A basic problem is to find the metric of space-time, for a given
configuration of matter-energy, by solving the Einstein equations (or
another equation in some other metric theory).
4.0.4 The metric
By definition, a metric is a tool which assigns a quadratic-interval (QI) to
any curve segment (rigorously, to any vector). We are used to Euclidean
(or Riemanian) metrics, where the always positive QI leads to the usual
definition of length (as its square root). But the relativistic theories use
a Lorentzian metric, which assigns a QI of any sign.
This leads first, in both Einsteinian theories, to a classification of the
curves9: they are called time-like, light-like or space-like when their QI is
positive, zero, or negative (the opposite convention also exists). This is
at the origin of the causal structure, see below.
This leads also to the definition of the proper duration of a segment of
a time-like curve: this is the square root of its QI. 10 Proper duration is
an attribute of a curve segment provided by the space-time metric. It is
not linked to any time, datation or time-function.
4.1 Time related notions in GR
Time and space are absent in the vocabulary of relativistic theories; as well
as velocities. 11 The metric of space-time leads however to the definition
of various quantities and structures with a temporal connotation.
• A causal structure (see next section) is a well defined causal ordering
in space-time, imprinted by the metric.
• A proper duration is assigned to each segment of a time-like curve;
in other words, to any history.
9 A curve is of a given type when its tangent vector always remains of that type.
10 Similarly, the proper length of a space-like curve segment is the square root of minus its
QI.
11 Four-velocities are however well defined in space-time, and usually simply called “ veloc-
ities ”.
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• The time-related notion of redshift is well defined and very useful in
relativistic theories.
• A space-time may or may not admit time functions, defined in sec-
tion 5. When it does, it admits an infinite number of them. Each
may share some properties of Newtonian time: it defines a datation,
an associated chronology, an associated simultaneity... But these
notions can be defined in an infinite number of different manners,
which contradict each other.
Contrary to the case of Newtonian physics, these notions are not mutually
compatible. For instance,
• the chronology defined from one datation differs from the chronology
defined by another; and it does not coincide with the causal ordering.
• In two space-times admitting the same causal structure, the proper
durations assigned to the same history are (in general) different.
• Given a time function, the proper duration of a history is not the
difference between the terminal and initial dates of the history.
4.2 The causal structure
Any (relativistic) space-time admits a well defined causal structure. It
is defined from its Lorentzian metric 12 through the following steps:
• The Lorentzian metric assigns (by definition) a quadratic interval
(QI) to any curve segment (rigorously, to any vector).
• This classifies the segments as time-like, light-like or space-like ac-
cording to the sign of their QI (positive, zero or negative respec-
tively). 13
• By extension, this also classifies the curves; only the curves all of
whose segments (all tangent vectors) keep the same sign are retained
as physically significant.
• Non space-like curves are called causal.
This establishes the possible causal relations between two events A
and B (points in space-time):
• A causally precedes B (A ≤ B) if there is a future-directed 14 causal
curve from A to B (and reciprocally);
• A and B are causally disconnected, if there is no causal curve joining
them.
12 in fact from its conformal part only. Two different metrics are said to be conformally
related where one is equal to the other multiplied by a scalar function; a conformal structure
is an equivalence class under this relation.
13 A conformal structure does not associate a QI to a segment, but only a sign. This is
sufficient to establish the present classification.
14 space-time is assumed to be oriented, and time-oriented.
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This order relation is the causal structure of space-time. A main dif-
ference with the Newtonian case — where the third possibility is absent
— is that the ordering is partial rather than total. An immediate conse-
quence is the impossibility to associate to an event something which can
be called its present.
The causal structure is well defined in any space-time. It is completely
independent from any notion of temporal character, like time-function,
datation, chronology or proper durations...
It may be important to remark that the presence of a well defined
causal structure – which is always guaranteed in any space-time – does not
forbid what are called “ chronology violations ” (also sometimes “ causal-
ity violations ”); like, e.g., time travel. In fact, time travel is possible in
a given space-time, only if no (global) time-function exists. As a conse-
quence, time travel is incompatible with the existence of time. The pur-
pose of Go¨del, when he exhibited his solutions of general relativity with
the possibility of time travel, was precisely to illustrate the impossibility
of the existence of time [7, 12, 30, 11, 2].
In general relativity, the causal structure is defined from the metric.
Some present speculative approaches try to define space-time without a
metric, but retain the causal structure only. Then, it is intrinsically de-
fined as an order relation in the set of events, without any reference to
a metric. 15 This is for instance at the basis of the causet (for “ causal
set”) approaches (see, e.g., [6], [10], [27], [28]).
4.3 World lines and Proper time
4.3.1 The world line
The fundamental rule of relativistic theories is that
a material object (in particular an observer) follows a time-like
line in space-time, called its world line.
This is the line of its successive positions in space-time. Reciprocally, each
time-like line in space-time may be seen as the world line of a potential
observer. More condensed, in a chrono-geometrical language, a physical
system (a particle, an observer ...) is its own world line.
A physical process is a continuous succession of events experienced by
a physical system like an observer 16: a part of his life, represented by
a portion of his world line, represents a history. The metric of space-
time assigns to any history — a portion of a time-like curve — its proper
duration.
The proper duration is the real physical quantity that an observer (or
physical system) may experience and call a duration in the usual sense.
A physical measurement, using any kind of clock, always gives the proper
duration of the clock history (which is also mine if I am close to the clock).
My physiological time (the beat of my heart); my intellectual time (e.g.,
15 thus, without the possibility to consider proper durations, proper times, or time functions.
16 I call observer any physical system which is able to record something, in particular
its proper time; an observer is typically a human being; but this can be any device with
recording ability. Since an atom itself may have transitions resulting from an interaction
with,e.g., radiation, it is sometimes considered as an observer.
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the one necessary for a mental calculation) etc. are linked to my proper
time. This is a fundamental assumption of the relativistic theories. Note
again that this has no relation with any kind of time-function.
A important point is that an observer may experience — or measure
— proper durations along his own world line only (where he stands); the
notion has absolutely no meaning elsewhere in space-time. There is no
way, and this has no meaning, to try to compare the proper times of differ-
ent observers, except in the trivial case when they share (approximately)
the same world line.
A fundamental difference with Newtonian physics comes from the fact
that the proper duration of a history is not fixed by its initial and final
events: it depends on the whole corresponding trajectory ( world line) in
space-time; and does not obey the property (D) mentioned above. Be-
tween two given events, there is however one unique 17 curve segment (a
history) which has the longest proper duration : the geodesic. 18 This
is a straight line when space-time is flat (e.g., Minkowski spacetime). In
the case where a datation has been defined, the proper duration is not
the difference of dates between its terminal events. The Langevin twin
“ paradox ” is an illustration of this situation: between the same initial
and final events, the two twins have experienced different (proper) du-
rations: their ages are different when they meet again. More generally,
between two specified events, two observers A and B experience different
proper durations associated to their different histories.
In the general case, the redshift is a tool allowing to compare the
different perceptions of a given process by two different observers. But
it would have no meaning to say that one proper time is flowing faster
or slower than an other; or that one duration is contracted or dilated
w.r.t. the other.
4.3.2 Proper time
A given observer O may define a proper time flowing along his world line
only (that I also write O). After the choice of an arbitrary origin O (a
point on the world line), its value for an event A of O is defined as the
proper duration separating A from O, counted with a sign which depends
on the time-orientation. This proper time is defined on O only, not in
the universe outside. Thus it does not define a datation, and provides no
chronology, for events out of O.
A selected observer (like “ me ”) may wish to extend the validity of
his proper time outside the whole universe. He will search for a time-
function which, when restricted to his world line O, coincides with his
proper time. There is an infinite number of different manners to perform
such an extension: this requirement selects an infinite sub-family among
the infinite family of possible time functions. Two observers select dif-
ferent sub-families (in some particular cases — like inertial observer in
17 Except in specific situations like gravitational lensing or a multi-connected universe [18].
18 This is in exact analogy with the case of Riemanian geometry in space: between two
points of space, there is a line with shortest length: the geodesic; a straight line in flat
Euclidean space.
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Minkowski spacetime — there is a canonical way to privilegiate one, see
below).
5 Time functions in relativistic theories
The Newtonian time is a datation, i.e., a time-function. Proper times
or durations do not define datations. Do the relativistic theories admit
time-functions ?
The definition remains the same : a function which assigns to each
event a number, and which increases along each future directed time-like
line. 19 This means that such a time-function “ flows ” for each objet
along its world line.
A time function generates a foliation of space-time: a decomposition
of the type of a product Space × Time, the latter being identified to the
time function. 20 The “ spatial sections ” are the level hypersurfaces
of the time-function. Thus, a first condition for the existence of a time-
function is that the space-time admits such a splitting. This is not always
the case, and an important result is that some space-times – which are
solutions of general relativity – do not admit any time function.
When a time function does exist, there is always an infinity of them. 21
We examine below when, and how, is it possible to make a pertinent
selection among this diversity. This is analog to the search for a vertical
direction in the isotropic Newtonian space and, similarly, this requires (in
general) a reference external to the chrono-geometry of space-time.
We insist on the fact that a time-function does not coincide, in general,
with the proper time of an observer along his world line; and that the
proper duration of a process (what is measured by its clock) differs from
the corresponding lapse of a time-function.
5.1 Time functions in special relativity
The Minkowski spacetime admits an infinity of possible decompositions
under the form of a product time × space. Each generates an infinity of
time-functions, related by reparametrizations.
Since Minkowski spacetime is flat (without curvature), it seems rea-
sonable to require that the spatial sections are flat also (i.e., each identical
(isometric) to the Euclidean space IR3). This is equivalent to require that
the time-lines are straight lines. This constraint reduces the plurality of
time-functions, but still leaves an infinity of them, which lead to different
and contradictory datations, chronology, simultaneity.
A further step may be to require that the time function coincides
with the proper time of an inertial observer, along his world line. This
19 That the time-function increases along the world line of an observer does not imply that
it is identical to his proper time: it can be any increasing function of the proper time.
20 A time function generates an unique foliation; a foliation generates a family of time
functions related by reparametrizations.
21 Analogy: in the Newtonian isotropic space, there exits an infinity of equivalent directions
which may be called the vertical; here, the infinity of arbitrary possibilities is still much
“ larger ”.
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reduces again the choice; but still leaves an infinity of possibilities, corre-
sponding to all possible spatial orientations of an observer. The isotropy
of Minkowski spacetime guaranties – by definition – that all these di-
rections are equivalent: all these time-functions share exactly the same
status; none of them plays a privileged role.
A final selection requires the choice of a particular inertial observer. A
natural choice is “ me ”, assuming that I am inertial, which is a reasonable
approximation when high precision is not required. Thus I may chose the
time function coinciding with my proper time along my world line (and
defining flat spatial sections). This corresponds, in the context of special
relativity, to the choice made by Newton, that he called universal time.
(a more correct appellation would be “ my universal time ”.) But if I am
observing a galaxy, for instance, it could be more convenient to chose the
“ universal time ” of that galaxy. This would define a completely different
chronology, not compatible with the first one.
In any case,
- a different observer, having naturally chosen the time function coincid-
ing with his proper time along his world line, would adopt a chronol-
ogy entirely different from mine: he would assign different dates to the
events, and even different chronological ordering. His notion of simultane-
ity would contradict mine.
- the proper duration of a process (like the life time of a star, or of a
particle...) never coincides with the lapse of (my) universal time between
birth and death. Except for the history of my own life, since I defined the
(my) universal time for that purpose.
5.2 Time functions in general relativity
The Minkowski spacetime is only a very crude approximation to the real
world, since it does not take gravitation into account. In general relativity,
presently the best theory to describe the world, the situation is less simple.
First, the theory admits solutions where no time function may exist
(globally 22). A case is given for instance by the Go¨del’s solution, that
he constructed with the specific purpose of showing explicitly the impos-
sibility to define time in general relativity [12, 30]. There are many other
solutions of the theory in which no time function may exist. Most of them
allow the possibility of time travel (whose physical pertinence is still under
discussion today) (see, e.g., [11, 2, 15]).
The majority of the solutions of general relativity which have been pro-
posed to describe realistic situations, admit however an infinity of global
time-functions. Since they lead to contradictory datations, chronologies,
and notion of simultaneity, this raises again the question of selecting one.
The situation is similar to that in special relativity presented above, al-
though with some differences.
22 For most of these solutions, it is however possible to define local time functions; i.e., valid
in some limited region of space-time. When restricted to such a limited region of the universe,
the discussion is similar to that below
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5.2.1 Spatial sections with constant curvature
In special relativity, we applied a first prescription by selecting those time
functions leading to spatial sections with zero curvature. This is not pos-
sible (in general) in the curved space-time of general relativity. A less
severe prescription would consist in requiring spatial sections (level hy-
persurfaces) to verify some symmetry property, namely being of constant
curvature (homogeneous and isotropic). Only a very limited class of solu-
tions of the theory allows this possibility: the corresponding space-times
are said to obey the cosmological principle (CP); this is the definition.
The family of such solutions constitute the Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre models.
For a space-time obeying the CP, we may require in addition that the
time-function coincides with the proper time of an inertial observer. This
still reduces the variety of time-functions. But I will not go deeper into
the details of the procedure because of the following remarks.
First, this applies only to the very limited class of space-times obeying
the CP. This is not the case of our real universe, where galaxies and galaxy
clusters imprint local curvature at various places of space-time, so that no
spatial sections with constant curvature can be found: the cosmological
description of our Universe with the popular Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre models
(including the big bang models) is a zero order approximation only, which
neglects all the curvature fluctuations imprinted by the cosmic structures.
The validity of a time-function selected through the constant curvature
requirement cannot be extended beyond this zero order approximation.
For realistic cosmology, its limited pertinence is very difficult to evaluate.
Quite fortunately, another type of selection procedure may be applied
to (most of) these models: that of the cosmic time (defined below). At
the zero order (i.e., for the unperturbed cosmological models), it coincides
with the constant curvature procedure above; but it extends nicely to
the (perturbed) real situation. Thus, the constant curvature procedure
appears useless [5].
5.3 Cosmic time
Given a space-time, the cosmic time is a particular time-function defined
in the following way: its value at an event X is the supremum of all the
proper durations of all future directed time-like curves ending in X.
Not every space-time admits a cosmic time. For instance, Minkowski
spacetime does not, since such a supremum has an infinite value for any
event. When it is defined (taking finite values), it is by construction
strictly growing along each future-directed time-like curve.
Cosmic time is well defined for the expanding Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre mod-
els at the basis of our cosmology, at least for those with a big bang (see,
e.g., [5]), through their metric. For a specific class of (imaginary) iner-
tial observers, called comoving, it coincides for each with his proper-time
along his world line. The terrestrial observer is, in first approximation,
one of these comoving inertial observers. The cosmic time, like any time
function, defines a congruence of time lines everywhere tangent to the
gradient of the time function: the world congruence. One may imagine
that space-time is filled of (imaginary) comoving observers following these
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lines.
5.3.1 Material cosmic time
This suggests an alternative option [26] to define a “ material cosmic time”
as the function which identifies with the proper time of each (imaginary)
observer of this congruence, along his worldline. This is a particular case of
the general possibility to define a time function from a material content.
Strictly speaking, this requires however that the corresponding matter
(conveniently called a cosmic clock) occupies the totallity of the points
of space-time, in order that the world lines form a congruence and that
the time-function is defined everywhere. We may wish, for instance, to
consider the collection of galaxies present in our Universe as such a cosmic
clock. But the time-function would remain undefined at the points where
no galaxy is present and it is very difficult to define an averaging process
in curved space-time (see more in [26]) to restore the lacking information.
In addition, galaxies are subject to proper motions (which superpose to
the cosmic expansion), so that their proper times, flowing along their
world lines, would not coincide with the cosmic time according to the first
definition: for each galaxy, there would be a local redshift factor between
the two “ cosmic times ” corresponding to the two definitions, to which
no observation could give access.
But the main objection comes from the impossibility to have any ob-
servational access to material cosmic time according to its definition. Even
if we assume that galaxies (or other objects) fill the totality of space-time,
and if we do not worry about their proper motions, there is no possibil-
ity to measure the proper time along a given world line for an observer
outside that world line. This makes this definition useless in practice.
However, the formal existence of such “ material time functions ”, even if
they remain out of measurement possibilities, is an important fact which
plays a role for handling the “ problem of time ” in quantum gravity (see
below).
5.3.2 Validity of cosmic time
Coming back to the original definition, cosmic time, like any time-function,
defines spatial sections (its level hypersurfaces which foliate space-time).
23 For the Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre models – which obey the CP – these sec-
tions have constant curvature, so that the cosmic time precisely obeys the
constant curvature criterion mentioned above. Its advantage lies in the
fact that its definition still holds in a perturbed cosmological model, which
describe our real universe.
The cosmic time applies only to a restricted set of solutions of gen-
eral relativity, which seem however well adapted to describe our whole
universe. Cosmology mostly uses in fact an “ averaged cosmic time ” :
defined from a strict Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre model which is only a zero or-
der approximation, an averaged version, of our real universe. An exact –
but unknown – version of cosmic time does exist, which would provide a
convenient chronology for our real, perturbed, Universe.
23 The world lines of comoving matter are orthogonal to these sections.
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This assumes however that our Universe is well described by a so called
big bang model with an initial singularity. Most cosmologists however
estimate today that this is not the case, and that the present phase of
cosmic expansion did not begin in such a singularity but may result, for
instance, from a cosmic bounce following a phase of cosmic contraction.
The corresponding space-time would admit no cosmic time, although some
other cosmic time functions (see below) may remain defined, at least in
some part of space-time.
5.3.3 Cosmic time is not a time
Assuming that cosmic time is well defined, it provides a useful cosmic
chronology, which is its main advantage. For instance, the “ age of the
universe ” tU is its value here and now (thus, the extremum of all the
proper durations of all future-directed time-like curve ending here and
now). This is perfectly well defined, and implies that no object can have
an age greater than tU . It should be realized however that
- the proper duration of a cosmic process (say, the life of a star) as physi-
cally measured by a clock is not (in general) the difference between the
cosmic time values of end and beginning. It may differ by a very impor-
tant factor (which tends to infinity for a very quickly moving object) .
- For a non comoving observer, the cosmic time differs with his (physical)
proper time — the only that he has the capacity to measure — along his
world line (also by an important factor).
- Different events sharing the same value of the cosmic time are not
simultaneous according to the Einstein’s synchronization procedure, even
performed by comoving observers [16] (this is still worse for non comoving
observers).
The cosmic time has a local physical pertinence for the terrestrial
observer since it coincides with his “ universal time ” along his world
line. But this universal time is well defined from proper durations and
the reference to cosmic time is unnecessary in that purpose. Moreover,
cosmic time coincides with universal time only in the approximation that
the terrestrial observer is comoving.
The main defect of cosmic time, however, is the impossibility to have
access to it directly: if we consider a cosmic event, like the explosion of a
supernova in a remote galaxy, no physical measurement provides its value.
The latter may only be obtained through an indirect reconstitution from
the redshift measurement. The latter suffers however two important draw-
backs. First, un unknown component of the redshift is not cosmological
and caused by the proper motion of the observed source. This introduces
an error and the best we can do (and that is done in fact) is to assume
that such errors average to zero for a statistical population of galaxies.
This requires however to consider averaging processes which are known to
suffer from biases. At best, cosmic time estimations could be considered
to be “ true on average ”. The second drawback results from the fact that
the conversion from a redshift (even assumed perfectly “ cosmological ”)
to a value of cosmic time requires a perfect knowledge of the cosmological
model, i.e., of the shape of space-time. Given our uncertain knowledge
of the Hubble constant, of the deceleration parameter and of the infinite
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list of similar cosmological parameters, we must realize that an assigned
value of cosmic time to an observed event is model dependent.
5.3.4 Other cosmic time functions
The cosmic time being not measurable, only (at best) statistically defined
and model dependent, it would be wise to consider it as an useful con-
vention to describe the chronology of the cosmic events rather than as
physically relevant quantity, in any case certainly not a time. For this
reason, cosmological calculations most often use other time-functions.
- The conformal time has properties comparable to those of the cosmic
time. It does not identify with the proper times of inertial observers but
it has more direct links with the causal structure of space-time than the
cosmic time and this is the main reason of its preferred use in cosmological
calculations. It also has the nice property (not shared by cosmic time)
that different events sharing the same value of the conformal time are seen
as simultaneous by a comoving observer applying the Einstein’s prescrip-
tion [16]. It is however – like the cosmic time – not directly measurable.
- The (properly normalized ) scale factor of the universe may be seen as
a convenient time function. It offers the same advantages as the cosmic
time, except that it does not coincides with the proper times of inertial
observers. Its value τ is however directly accessible from observations.
Namely, for a source (galaxy) observed with redshift z, τ = k
1+z
, where
k is a normalization constant which may be is conveniently chosen as the
present “ age of the Universe ” tU . One can also conveniently use the log-
arithm of that quantity. It is also linked to the Cosmic Microwave Back-
ground temperature T through the relation τ = tU
T0
T
, where T0 ≈ 2.7K
is the present temperature of the cosmic radiation. It also suffers from the
fact that the measured redshift is not cosmological but has an unknown
proper component.
Thus, even in the simplest situation of a space-time obeying the CP,
different time functions may be chosen. Each choice assigns “ dates ”
to the cosmic events, but they contradict each other. 24 What is the
preferred choice is a pure question of taste (cosmic time seems good for
popularization) but the best attitude is probably no choice at all since it
is perfectly possible to perform any cosmological calculation or reasoning
without reference to any time function. Any choice (cosmic time or other)
would remain a convention, more or less adapted to such or such study,
and cannot pretend to have the status of a physical quantity and to offer a
notion of time. A confusion of such notion with time would be a possible
cause of mistake: a neutron, whose (average) life time is of the order of
14 minutes, may perfectly experience a lapse of several years of cosmic
time; a star living one million year may perfectly subsist during a lapse
of several millions years of cosmic time etc .
24 For instance, in any big bang cosmological model, the recombination takes place at a
fixed value of redhift-time, namely tU/zrec, where zrec ≈ 1 100. In a model without inflation,
the value of the conformal time at recombination is of the same order of magnitude; in a
model with inflation, it is almost infinite. This discrepancy is a direct expression of the effect
of inflation (see, e.g., [4]).
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6 Time and general relativity
To summarize, general relativity admits two well defined notions which are
usually associated to time: the causal structure and the proper durations.
This is not sufficient to define a notion similar to time, which requires at
least the existence of a time-function.
First, the existence of solutions of general relativity admitting no time-
functions implies that the notion of time is not generically defined in the
theory and does not belong to its ontology. This has been emphasized by
many authors, in particular by Go¨del [7].
On the other hand the theory admits many solutions sufficiently reg-
ular to allow time-functions. Selecting one requires however the adoption
of a particular and subjective point of view, linked in general to a specific
observer, with additional assumptions like for instance that of a specific
matter component filling the universe. Even at this price it remains that,
even in the most favorable situations, chronological propositions deduced
from a time function cannot be reconciled with physical measurements of
a temporal nature, in particular proper durations.
This impossibility is deeply rooted in the Einsteinian theory and is
one of its most fundamental properties: the clearest manifestation of the
impossibility to include the notion of time in its ontology: any philosoph-
ical attempt to interpret the reality of the world in conformity with our
present physics must renounce the notion of time.
In a specific situation, it is always possible to chose a time function
or another; for instance compatible with the proper time of an observer,
or of an observed system, or obeying an alternative convenient prescrip-
tion. Some authors like this old-fashioned way but it is dangerous since a
confusion with time would be a source of errors.
For precise astronomical positioning, spatial navigation or commu-
nication (like for the decoding of the Global Positioning System (GPS)
signals), there is no adapted choice of a time function. In such situations,
one may use convenient space-time coordinates without any spatial or
temporal character like for instance radar or GPS coordinates [8, 17, 19].
The study of the possibilities of time travel (involving explicit solutions
like the Go¨del Universe [12], with strongly counter-intuitive implications)
is also an active field in general relativity. It is completely incompati-
ble with any time function (since the possibility of time travel excludes
the possibility of their existence [15]) and the relevant tool is the causal
structure of space-time.
Let me finish by shortly mentioning some aspects of present research
in fundamental physics with the quest for a new theory with more unify-
ing power; which could, e.g., reconcile quantum and (general) relativistic
physics. Such an enquiry has to face very seriously the non existence of
time. This is the case for the search of a theory of quantum gravity [29],
where the so called “ problem of time ” [13, 1, 20] has (at least) two facets.
First, our usual view of quantization requires a notion of time, which is
absent in the relativistic context. 25 This is one of the most serious dif-
25 An aspect of this non existence is technically expressed by the time-reparametrization
invariance, a facet of the covariance of the general relativity theory.
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ficulties for the tentative quantization of gravitation. [21]26 Secondly, a
quantum space-time (if such a thing does exist; it is precisely the goal of
quantum gravity to define it) would admit no defined metric (but only a
“ fluctuating one ” in some popularized language). Thus, even the notions
of causal structure and proper durations (which, in general relativity, are
imprinted by the metric) disappear: not only time is absent in quantum
gravity (if such a theory does exists), but also the notions with temporal
flavor that we have encountered in general relativity.
This motivates a collection of speculative answers for filling this gap.
Let us mention the relational time [23, 3], or clock time (or semi-classical
time) 27, which may to some extent play the role of a time function. The
thermal time (a case of emergent time) [25, 9, 24] may provide a way to
construct some analogous to proper time in the absence of a well defined
classical (non quantum) space-time... These are attempts to define a
physical notion with some validity in the context of a future theory, from
which time-related notions could emerge.
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